A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks
AbstractThis paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 808.
Date of creation: Feb 2005
Date of revision: Sep 2005
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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/
Networks; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Competition Policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2005-09-29 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-LAW-2005-09-29 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-NET-2005-09-29 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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