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Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing


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  • Wouter Dessein


Previous research has argued that, in the mature phase of competition,telecommunications networks may use access charges as an instrument of collusion. Weshow that this result depends totally on the assumption of linear pricing. Though undernonlinear pricing, the access charge alters the way networks use menus of tariffs todiscriminate implicitly among heterogeneous customers, profits are then independent ofthe access charge, or, if participation constraints are binding, are maximized by thewelfare maximizing access charge. In the entry phase, networks often differ in coststructure. An access markup then affects the level playing field between networks. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Netzwettbewerb bei nicht linearer Preispolitik) Die industrieökonomische Forschung hat bisher gezeigt, daß in der Marktphase der Reife, beim Wettbewerb von Telekommunikationsnetzen die Zugangsgebühren als ein Instrument des kollusiven Verhaltens eingesetzt werden können. Es wird gezeigt, daß dieses Ergebnis vollständig von den Annahmen des linearen Preisverhaltens abhängt. Obwohl bei nichtlinearer Preispolitik Zugangsgebühren den Einsatz von Tarifmenüs der Netzwerkbetreiber hinsichtlich einer impliziten Diskriminierung zwischen heterogenen Nachfragern beeinflussen, sind die Gewinne dann aber unabhängig von den Zugangsgebühren oder, wenn Teilnahmebeschränkungen bindend sind, dann werden sie maximiert durch die wohlfahrtmaximierenden Zugangsgebühren. In der Markteintrittsphase sind Netze oft durch Unterschiede in der Kostenstruktur gekennzeichnet. Ein Zugangsgebührenzuschlag beeinflußt dann das Niveau, auf dem der Wettbewerb der Netzanbieter stattfindet.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) in its series CIG Working Papers with number FS IV 00-22.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2000
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in the RAND Journal of Economics , Vol. 34(4), Winter 2003, pp. 593-611.
Handle: RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv00-22

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Keywords: Telecommunications; Interconnection; two-way access; competition policy; nonlinear pricing;

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