Competition in telecommunication networks with call externalities
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.
Volume (Year): 34 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298
Networks competition; Call externalities; Access price; L10; L50; L96;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dessein, Wouter, 2004. "Network competition with heterogeneous customers and calling patterns," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 323-345, September.
- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2004. "Access charges and quality choice in competing networks," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 391-409, September.
- Dessein, Wouter, 2003.
" Network Competition in Nonlinear Pricing,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
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- Jeong-Yoo Kim & Yoonsung Lim, 2000.
"An Economic Analysis of the Receiver Pays Principle,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
0334, Econometric Society.
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- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2005. "Information Exchange and Competition in Communications Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 5031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
- Jong-Hee Hahn, 2000.
"Nonlinear Pricing of Telecommunications with Call and Network Externalities,"
Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001)
2000/15, Department of Economics, Keele University, revised Nov 2001.
- Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2003. "Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 949-967, September.
- Poletti, Stephen & Wright, Julian, 2004. "Network interconnection with participation constraints," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 347-373, September.
- Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000.
"Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competiti on,"
Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
739, The University of Melbourne.
- Gans, Joshua S. & King, Stephen P., 2001. "Using 'bill and keep' interconnect arrangements to soften network competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 413-420, June.
- Edmond Baranes & Laurent Flochel, 2003. "Competition and mergers in networks with call externalities," Post-Print halshs-00178580, HAL.
- Peitz, Martin, 2005. "Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 341-358, February.
- Wright, Julian, 2002. "Access Pricing under Competition: An Application to Cellular Networks," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 289-315, September.
- Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 1999. "Interconnection in Network Industries," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 1-25, February.
- Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2003. "Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 205-213, November.
- Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2004.
"Network competition and interconnection with heterogeneous subscribers,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 611-631, May.
- Jong-Hee Hahn, 2000. "Network Competition and Interconnection with Heterogeneous Subscribers," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2000/11, Department of Economics, Keele University.
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