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Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all

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  • Cambini, Carlo
  • Valletti, Tommaso M.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 81 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 205-213

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:81:y:2003:i:2:p:205-213

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso, 2003. "Investments and Network Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 3829, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. repec:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:3:p:413-42 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000. "Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competiti on," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 739, The University of Melbourne.
  4. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May.
  5. Patrick Degraba, 2003. "Efficient Intercarrier Compensation for Competing Networks When Customers Share the Value of A Call," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 207-230, 06.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Peitz, Martin & Valletti, Tommaso M. & Wright, Julian, 2004. "Competition in telecommunications: an introduction," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-321, September.
  2. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Bill-and-Keep vs. Cost-Based Access Pricing Revisited," Industrial Organization 0408002, EconWPA.
  3. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Access Charges in the Presence of Call Externalities," Industrial Organization 0408009, EconWPA, revised 31 Aug 2004.
  4. repec:lmu:msmdpa:12688 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Tommaso M. Valletti & Carlo Cambini, 2005. "Investments and Network Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 446-468, Summer.
  6. Pio Baake & Kay Mitusch, 2005. "Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 500, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  7. Berger, Ulrich, 2005. "Bill-and-keep vs. cost-based access pricing revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 107-112, January.
  8. Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2004. "Access charges and quality choice in competing networks," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 391-409, September.
  9. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-003, JEPS.
  10. Zucchini, Leon & Claussen, Jörg & Trüg, Moritz, 2013. "Tariff-mediated network effects versus strategic discounting: Evidence from German mobile telecommunications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 751-759.
  11. Edmond Baranes & Laurent Flochel, 2008. "Competition in telecommunication networks with call externalities," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 53-74, August.
  12. Stühmeier, Torben, 2012. "Roaming and Investments in the Mobile Internet Market," DICE Discussion Papers 46, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  13. Sue Mialon, 2007. "Pricing access in network competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 109-123, February.
  14. Harbord, David & Pagnozzi, Marco, 2008. "On-Net/Off-Net Price Discrimination and 'Bill-and-Keep' vs. 'Cost-Based' Regulation of Mobile Termination Rates," MPRA Paper 14540, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  15. repec:lmu:msmdpa:13764 is not listed on IDEAS
  16. Geoffron, Patrice & Wang, Haobo, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/79, Paris Dauphine University.

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