Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns
AbstractWe introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with non-uniform calling patterns, which account for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small subset of people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profit-maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition, and the resulting on-net prices are below off-net prices, if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8114.
Date of creation: Nov 2010
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- Steffen Hoernig & Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2011. "Calling Circles: Network Competition with Non-Uniform Calling Patterns," CEIS Research Paper 206, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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