Network Competition with Income Effects
AbstractI generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand. Empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant. Income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination rates: Unregulated network operators competing in non-discriminatory retail contracts negotiate termination rates above cost for any positive income effect. This also holds when operators discriminate between on-net and off-net calls if networks are differentiated. Operators profit from increasing termination rates above cost under second-degree price discrimination if a sufficient share of consumers prefer on-net/off-net contracts and their subscription demand is relatively inelastic.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 903.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 29 Feb 2012
Date of revision: 08 Jan 2014
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Income effects; Network competition; Profit neutrality; Second-degree price discrimination; Termination-based discrimination;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Tommaso M. Valletti & Carlo Cambini, 2005.
"Investments and Network Competition,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 446-468, Summer.
- Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
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