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Price discrimination

Author

Listed:
  • Armstrong, Mark

Abstract

This paper surveys recent economic research on price discrimination, both in monopoly and oligopoly markets. Topics include static and dynamic forms of price discrimination, and both final and input markets are considered. Potential antitrust aspects of price discrimination are highlighted throughout the paper. The paper argues that the informational requirements to make accurate policy are very great, and with most forms of price discrimination a laissez-faire policy may be the best available in practical terms. However, careful case-by-case analysis of situations involving selective price cuts and margin squeeze seems worthwhile.

Suggested Citation

  • Armstrong, Mark, 2006. "Price discrimination," MPRA Paper 4693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4693
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4693/1/MPRA_paper_4693.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1993. "Price Discrimination, Competition and Regulation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 335-359, December.
    2. Yongmin Chen, 1997. "Paying Customers to Switch," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(4), pages 877-897, December.
    3. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 1998. "The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(1), pages 115-121, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price discrimination; bundling; entry deterrence; competition policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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