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DYNAMIC PRICE DISCRIMINATION WITH ASYMMETRIC FIRMS -super-*

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Author Info

  • YONGMIN CHEN

Abstract

This paper considers variants of a dynamic duopoly model where one firm has a stronger market position than its competitor. Consumers' past purchases may reveal their different valuations for the two firms' products. Price discrimination based on purchase histories tends to benefit consumers if it does not cause the weaker firm to exit; otherwise it can harm consumers. The effect of price discrimination also depends on firms' cost differences, market competitiveness, and consumers' time horizon. The stronger firm may price below cost in the presence of consumer switching costs, with the purpose and effect of eliminating competition. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal The Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 56 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 729-751

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:56:y:2008:i:4:p:729-751

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-1821

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Cited by:
  1. Degryse, H.A., 2008. "Price Discrimination Bans on Dominant Firms," Discussion Paper 2008-001, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  2. Gehrig, Thomas & Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2011. "History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(5), pages 732-739, June.
  3. Bernard Caillaud & Romain De Nijs, 2011. "Strategic loyalty reward in dynamic price Discrimination," PSE Working Papers halshs-00622291, HAL.
  4. De Nijs, Romain, 2013. "Information provision and behaviour-based price discrimination," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 32-40.
  5. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00622291 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Bouckaert, J.M.C. & Degryse, H.A. & Dijk, T. van, 2012. "Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-Discrimination Constraint," Discussion Paper 2012-009, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Oz Shy & Rune Stenbacka, 2011. "Customer recognition and competition," Working Papers 11-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  8. Esteves, Rosa Branca & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2010. "Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers," CEPR Discussion Papers 7683, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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