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Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry

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Author Info
Stefan Behringer () (Economics Department, Frankfurt University)

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Abstract

This paper looks at competition in the telecommunication industry. We determine the equilibrium pricing parameters for a duopoly situation with a particular emphasis on the role of competitively chosen non-reciprocal access prices. In the symmetric equilibrium the networks optimally choose positive access charge markups which reconciles empirical observation with the theoretical economics literature.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by JEPS in its series JEPS Working Papers with number 05-002.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:jep:wpaper:05002

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Related research
Keywords: Telecommunications; access pricing;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Entry, Access Pricing, and Welfare in the Telecommunications Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-003, JEPS.
    Other versions:
  2. Stefan Behringer, 2006. "Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications," JEPS Working Papers 06-005, JEPS.
    Other versions:
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