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Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry

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  • Behringer, Stefan

Abstract

This paper investigates the effects of entry on welfare in the Telecommunications industry. Equilibrium pricing parameters for monopoly and duopoly situations are determined where access charges are chosen non-cooperatively. Welfare comparisons between alternative access pricing regimes are also performed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 102 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 185-188

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:102:y:2009:i:3:p:185-188

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Keywords: Networks Telecommunications Competition policy Interconnection Access pricing;

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References

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  1. Armstrong, M., 1996. "Network interconnection," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9625, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  2. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 38-56, Spring.
  4. Armstrong, Mark & Wright, Julian, 2007. "Mobile call termination in the UK," MPRA Paper 2344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Armstrong, Mark, 1998. "Network Interconnection in Telecommunications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 545-64, May.
  6. Gans, J.S. & King, S.P., 2000. "Using 'Bill and Keep' Interconnect Arrangements to Soften Network Competiti on," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 739, The University of Melbourne.
  7. Behringer, Stefan, 2008. "Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-Cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications," MPRA Paper 11795, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Cambini, Carlo & Valletti, Tommaso M., 2003. "Network competition with price discrimination: 'bill-and-keep' is not so bad after all," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 205-213, November.
  9. Stefan Behringer, 2005. "Equilibrium non-reciprocal Access Pricing in the Telecommunication Industry," JEPS Working Papers 05-002, JEPS.
  10. repec:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:3:p:413-42 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Stefan Behringer, 2006. "Asymmetric Equilibria and Non-cooperative Access Pricing in Telecommunications," JEPS Working Papers 06-005, JEPS.
  2. Baranes, Edmond & Poudou, Jean-Christophe, 2010. "Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 172-176, March.
  3. Ahmet Özçam, 2012. "The Public Policy Implications of the Persistence of a Monopoly Versus a Duopolistic Market," Bogazici Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 26(1), pages 67-79.

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