IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/adr/anecst/y2017i127p33-60.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Edmond Baranes
  • Stefan Behringer
  • Jean-Christophe Poudou

Abstract

This paper considers collusion between asymmetric networks in the telecommunications industry. Its primary purpose is to fill the gap between the literature on collusion between asymmetric firms and the literature on collusion in the telecommunications industry. Employing the standard Hotelling framework of horizontal product differentiation with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination we allow for differentiation in a second dimension. Modulo locations, the subscribers to each network operator face an asymmetry parameter that directly impacts their demands and can capture asymmetries in demand elasticities, in demand size, or even both. The implications of these asymmetries for the possibility of sustaining collusion are investigated under alternative access pricing regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Edmond Baranes & Stefan Behringer & Jean-Christophe Poudou, 2017. "Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 127, pages 33-60.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2017:i:127:p:33-60
    DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.127.0033
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.127.0033
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.15609/annaeconstat2009.127.0033?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pio Baake & Kay Mitusch, 2009. "Mobile phone termination charges with asymmetric regulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(3), pages 241-261, April.
    2. Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
    3. Ángel L. López & Patrick Rey, 2009. "Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination," Working Papers 2009.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    4. Behringer, Stefan, 2009. "Entry, access pricing, and welfare in the telecommunications industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 185-188, March.
    5. Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2013. "Termination fees revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 738-750.
    6. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    7. Pierre Picard, 1988. "La tarification optimale des télécommunications : une présentation synthétique," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 12, pages 27-62.
    8. Steffen Hoernig & Roman Inderst & Tommaso Valletti, 2014. "Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(1), pages 155-175, March.
    9. Baranes, Edmond & Poudou, Jean-Christophe, 2010. "Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 172-176, March.
    10. Patrice Geoffron & Haobo Wang, 2008. "What is the mobile termination regime for the asymmetric firms with a calling club effect?," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 58-79.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/11246 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. repec:dau:papers:123456789/79 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Peitz, Martin & Valletti, Tommaso M. & Wright, Julian, 2004. "Competition in telecommunications: an introduction," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-321, September.
    14. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Vuong, 2012. "Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 204-222, October.
    15. Michael Carter & Julian Wright, 2003. "Asymmetric Network Interconnection," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 22(1), pages 27-46, February.
    16. Gruber,Harald, 2005. "The Economics of Mobile Telecommunications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521843270.
    17. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Huong Vuong, 2012. "Policy Implications of Asymmetric Termination Rate Regulation in Europe," Chapters, in: Gerald R. Faulhaber & Gary Madden & Jeffrey Petchey (ed.), Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefan Behringer, 2012. "Asymmetric equilibria and non-cooperative access pricing in telecommunications," International Journal of Management and Network Economics, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(3), pages 257-281.
    2. Ángel L. López & Patrick Rey, 2016. "Foreclosing Competition Through High Access Charges and Price Discrimination," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 436-465, September.
    3. Sjaak Hurkens & Ángel Luis López, 2010. "Mobile Termination and Consumer Expectations under the Receiver-Pays Regime," Working Papers 10-12, NET Institute.
    4. Ángel L. López & Patrick Rey, 2009. "Foreclosing Competition through Access Charges and Price Discrimination," Working Papers 2009.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    5. Sjaak Hurkens & Doh-Shin Jeon, 2009. "Mobile Termination and Mobile Penetration," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 777.09, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    6. Sjaak Hurkens & Angel L. Lopez, 2014. "Who Should Pay for Two-Way Interconnection?," Working Papers 774, Barcelona School of Economics.
    7. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Huong Vuong, 2012. "Policy Implications of Asymmetric Termination Rate Regulation in Europe," Chapters, in: Gerald R. Faulhaber & Gary Madden & Jeffrey Petchey (ed.), Regulation and the Performance of Communication and Information Networks, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Sjaak Hurkens & Ángel L. López, 2014. "Mobile Termination, Network Externalities and Consumer Expectations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 124(579), pages 1005-1039, September.
    9. Hoernig, Steffen, 2014. "Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: Theory and applications," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 57-69.
    10. Thomas P. Tangerås, 2014. "Network competition with income effects," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 45(3), pages 645-673, September.
    11. Luis López, Ángel, 2011. "Mobile termination rates and the receiver-pays regime," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 171-181, June.
    12. Rohit Prasad & Rupamanjari Ray, 2015. "The relation of traffic balance and network size: a case from the indian mobile industry," Netnomics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 149-167, December.
    13. Felix Höffler, 2009. "Mobile termination and collusion, revisited," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 246-274, June.
    14. Basalisco, Bruno, 2012. "The effect of user interaction on the demand for mobile text messages: Evidence from cross-country data," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 132-144.
    15. Baranes, Edmond & Poudou, Jean-Christophe, 2010. "Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 172-176, March.
    16. Hurkens, Sjaak & Jeon, Doh-Shin, 2012. "Promoting network competition by regulating termination charges," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 541-552.
    17. Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2013. "Termination fees revisited," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 738-750.
    18. Andreas Haller & Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, 2013. "Termination charges in the international parcel market," Chapters, in: Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer (ed.), Reforming the Postal Sector in the Face of Electronic Competition, chapter 19, pages 277-293, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. Hurkens, Sjaak & López, Ángel L., 2012. "The welfare effects of mobile termination rate regulation in asymmetric oligopolies: The case of Spain," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 369-381.
    20. Hurkens, Sjaak & López, Ángel L., 2021. "Mobile termination rates and retail regimes in Europe and the US: A unified theory of CPP and RPP," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collusion; Mobile Termination Rates; Network Asymmetries; Glide Path;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2017:i:127:p:33-60. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Secretariat General or Laurent Linnemer (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ensaefr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.