Mobile Phone Termination Charges with Asymmetric Regulation
AbstractWe model competition between two unregulated mobile phone companies with price-elastic demand and less than full market coverage. We also assume that there is a regulated full-coverage fixed network. In order to induce stronger competition, mobile companies could have an incentive to raise their reciprocal mobile-to-mobile access charges above the marginal costs of termination. Stronger competition leads to an increase of the mobiles' market shares, with the advantage that (genuine) network effects are strengthened. Therefore, 'collusion' may well be in line with social welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 500.
Length: 23 p.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Journal of Economics (2009), 241-261
Telecommunication; Mobile phones; Mobile-to-mobile access charges; Network effects;
Other versions of this item:
- Pio Baake & Kay Mitusch, 2009. "Mobile phone termination charges with asymmetric regulation," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 96(3), pages 241-261, April.
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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