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Contracting with Self-Esteem Concerns

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Author Info
Junichiro Ishida (Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University)

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Abstract

It is widely accepted in social psychology that the need to maintain and enhance self-esteem is a fundamental human motive. We incorporate this factor into an otherwise ordinary principal-agent framework and examine its impact on the optimal incentive scheme and the agent's behavior, especially focusing on a form of intrapersonal strategy known as self-handicapping. Incorporating self-esteem concerns into a contracting situation yields an implication that goes against the conventional wisdom: the standard tradeoff between risk and incentives may break down in the presence of self-esteem concerns because uncertainty mitigates the need for self-handicapping, providing a potential reason for why we do not empirically observe this tradeoff in a robust manner. We characterize an intuitive condition for this anomaly to arise and present a set of testable implications. Along the way, we also show that the fragility of self-esteem (the variance) is just as important as its level (the mean) in selecting agents. Finally, this simple logic is applied to a team problem to show why and how people are better motivated under team production than under individual production.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University in its series OSIPP Discussion Paper with number 06E004.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:osp:wpaper:06e004

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Postal: 1-31, Machikaneyama, Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Phone: +81-6-6850-6111
Web page: http://www.osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: Self-esteem Bayesian learning Tradeoff between risk and incentives Contract

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Hideshi Itoh, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(1), pages 18-45. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Self-Confidence And Personal Motivation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 871-915, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Michael Raith, 2003. "Competition, Risk, and Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1425-1436, September. [Downloadable!]
  4. Christian Grund & Dirk Sliwka, 2005. "Envy and Compassion in Tournaments," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(1), pages 187-207, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Florian Englmaier & Achim Wambach, 2005. "Optimal Incentive Contracts under Inequity Aversion," IZA Discussion Papers 1643, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Junichiro Ishida, 2006. "Team Incentives under Relative Performance Evaluation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(1), pages 187-206, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Pay Enough Or Don'T Pay At All," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Canice Prendergast, 2000. "What Trade-Off of Risk and Incentives?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 421-425, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. repec:att:wimass:1919988 is not listed on IDEAS
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