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Willpower and Personal Rules

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Author Info
Bénabou, Roland
Tirole, Jean

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Abstract

This Paper studies the internal commitment mechanisms or ‘personal rules’ (diets, exercise regimens, resolutions, moral or religious precepts, etc.) through which people seek to achieve self-control. Our theory is based on the idea of self-reputation over one’s willpower, which potentially transforms lapses in a personal rule into precedents that undermine future self-restraint. The foundation for such effects, in turn, is the imperfect recall of past motives and feelings, which leads people to draw inferences from their own past actions. We thus model the behaviour of individuals who are unsure of their willpower (ability to delay ratification) in certain states of the world, and show how self-control can be sustained by the fear of creating damaging precedents. We also show, however, that people will sometimes adopt excessively rigid rules that result in compulsive behaviours such as miserliness, workaholism, or anorexia. These represent costly forms of self-signaling where the individual is so afraid of appearing weak to himself that every decision becomes a test of his willpower, even when self-restraint is not even desirable ex-ante. Such common behaviours which appear to display a ‘salience of the future’ are thus not only consistent, but actually generated by (a concern over) present-oriented preferences. Finally, we analyse the cognitive underpinnings of self-regulation. We first show how equilibrium behaviour is shaped by the extent to which the individual’s self-monitoring is subject to opportunistic distortions of memory or attribution. We then study how recall and inference processes can themselves be endogenously determined through the use of self-sustaining cognitive rules and resolutions.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3143.

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Date of creation: Jan 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3143

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Related research
Keywords: memory motivation psychology self-control time inconsistency willpower

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    Other versions:
  2. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2002. "Self-Confidence And Personal Motivation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(3), pages 871-915, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  4. Loewenstein, George, 1996. "Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 272-292, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
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  13. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2001. "Time Inconsistent Preferences in Adam Smith and David Hume," Working Papers 2001-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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  17. Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(4), pages 541-68, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Emre Ozdenoren & Stephen Salant & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Willpower and the Optimal Control of Visceral Urges," Economics Working Papers 0069, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2005. "The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000073, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Klaus Nehring, 2006. "Self-Control through Second-Order Preferences," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000391, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Benito Arruñada, 2003. "Catholic Confession of Sins as Third-Party Moral Enforcement," Economics Working Papers 653, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
  5. Nir, A., 2004. "Relationships as commitment devices : strategic silence," Discussion Paper 49, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, 2006. "The Brain as a Hierarchical Organization," IEPR Working Papers 06.48, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR). [Downloadable!]
  7. Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2006. "Who Are the Trustworthy, We Think?," Working Papers in Economics 222, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. BATTAGLINI, Marco & BENABOU, Roland & TIROLE, Jean, 2003. "Self-Control in Peer Groups," IDEI Working Papers 189, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Emre Ozdenoren & Stephen Salant & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Willpower and Optimal Control of Visceral Urges," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001355, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2005. "Biases in Perceptions, Beliefs and Behavior," Levine's Bibliography 172782000000000063, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  11. Cameron Hepburn, 2003. "Hyperbolic Discounting and Resource Collapse," Economics Series Working Papers 159, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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