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Team Incentives under Relative Performance Evaluation

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  • Junichiro Ishida

Abstract

"This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives in the repeated setting with many agents under the restriction that only relative performance evaluation is feasible for contracting. We show that the optimal contract in the repeated setting may take a different form than that in the static setting. In the repeated setting, it may be optimal for the principal to arbitrarily divide the agents into teams and compensate them based on team ranking, as it allows the principal to motivate the agents through peer sanctions. The situation draws a clear contrast to the static setting where such a strategy is never optimal. The result indicates that the concept of team plays an important role in the repeated setting even when performances can only be evaluated in relative terms." Copyright 2006, The Author(s) Journal Compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.

Volume (Year): 15 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 187-206

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Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:15:y:2006:i:1:p:187-206

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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/

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Cited by:
  1. Ishida, Junichiro, 2009. "Incentives in academics: Collaboration under weak complementarities," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 215-223, April.
  2. Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2007. "Cooperation in knowledge-intensive firms," Discussion Papers 2007/27, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
  3. Ishida, Junichiro, 2012. "Contracting with self-esteem concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 329-340.
  4. Collins, Alan R. & Maille, Peter, 2011. "Group decision-making theory and behavior under performance-based water quality payments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(4), pages 806-812, February.
  5. Junichiro Ishida, 2013. "Multilayered Tournaments," ISER Discussion Paper 0879, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

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