IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/18939.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Inspection Technology, Detection and Compliance: Evidence from Florida Restaurant Inspections

Author

Listed:
  • Ginger Zhe Jin
  • Jungmin Lee

Abstract

In this article, we show that a small innovation in inspection technology can make substantial differences in inspection outcomes. For restaurant hygiene inspections, the state of Florida has introduced a handheld electronic device, the portable digital assistant (PDA), which reminds inspectors of 1,000 potential violations that may be checked for. Using inspection records from July 2003 to June 2009, we find that the adoption of PDA led to 11% more detected violations and subsequently restaurants may have gradually increased their compliance efforts. We also find that PDA use is significantly correlated with a reduction in restaurant-related foodborne disease outbreaks.

Suggested Citation

  • Ginger Zhe Jin & Jungmin Lee, 2013. "Inspection Technology, Detection and Compliance: Evidence from Florida Restaurant Inspections," NBER Working Papers 18939, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18939
    Note: IO
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18939.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan S. Feinstein, 1991. "An Econometric Analysis of Income Tax Evasion and its Detection," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 14-35, Spring.
    2. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    3. Dilip Mookherjee & Ivan Png, 1989. "Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 399-415.
    4. Ginger Zhe Jin & Jungmin Lee, 2018. "A Tale of Repetition: Lessons from Florida Restaurant Inspections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 159-188.
    5. David Martimort, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(4), pages 929-947.
    6. Canice Prendergast, 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 180-196, March.
    7. Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, 2003. "The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(2), pages 409-451.
    8. Feinstein, Jonathan S, 1989. "The Safety Regulation of U.S. Nuclear Power Plants: Violations, Inspections, and Abnormal Occurrences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 115-154, February.
    9. Hausman, Jerry & Hall, Bronwyn H & Griliches, Zvi, 1984. "Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R&D Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 909-938, July.
    10. Joshua Angrist & Victor Lavy, 2002. "New Evidence on Classroom Computers and Pupil Learning," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 735-765, October.
    11. Jeffrey T. Macher & John W. Mayo & Jack A. Nickerson, 2011. "Regulator Heterogeneity and Endogenous Efforts to Close the Information Asymmetry Gap," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 25-54.
    12. Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt, 2003. "Computing Productivity: Firm-Level Evidence," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 793-808, November.
    13. Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003. "Information, Decisions, and Productivity: On-Board Computers and Capacity Utilization in Trucking," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1328-1353, September.
    14. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-259, April.
    15. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
    16. Hamermesh, Daniel S., 2007. "AJAE Appendix: Time to Eat: Household Production Under Increasing Income Inequality," American Journal of Agricultural Economics APPENDICES, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(4), pages 1-8, November.
    17. Susan Athey & Scott Stern, 2002. "The Impact of Information Technology on Emergency Health Care Outcomes," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(3), pages 399-432, Autumn.
    18. Luis Garicano & Paul Heaton, 2010. "Information Technology, Organization, and Productivity in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Departments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 167-201, January.
    19. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    20. Henrik Jacobsen Kleven & Martin B. Knudsen & Claus Thustrup Kreiner & Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, 2011. "Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 79(3), pages 651-692, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Philip Makofske, 2020. "The Effect of Information Salience on Product Quality: Louisville Restaurant Hygiene and Yelp.com," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 52-92, March.
    2. Jason Miller & Beth Davis‐Sramek & Brian S. Fugate & Mark Pagell & Barbara B. Flynn, 2021. "Editorial Commentary: Addressing Confusion in the Diffusion of Archival Data Research," Journal of Supply Chain Management, Institute for Supply Management, vol. 57(3), pages 130-146, July.
    3. Kovács, Balázs & Lehman, David W. & Carroll, Glenn R., 2020. "Grade inflation in restaurant hygiene inspections: Repeated interactions between inspectors and restaurateurs," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    4. Carl Kitchens & Matthew Philip Makofske & Le Wang, 2019. "“Crime” on the Field," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(3), pages 821-864, January.
    5. Ginger Zhe Jin & Jungmin Lee, 2018. "A Tale of Repetition: Lessons from Florida Restaurant Inspections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 159-188.
    6. Hisayuki Yoshimoto & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2019. "Are There 'Ratatouille' Restaurants? On Anticorrelation of Food Quality and Hygiene," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 202001, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, revised 05 Mar 2020.
    7. Sarah Dolfin & Nan Maxwell & Ankita Patnaik, "undated". "WHD Compliance Strategies: Directions for Future Research," Mathematica Policy Research Reports b7a5ca876e0b448f9b9c0850e, Mathematica Policy Research.
    8. D. Mark Anderson & Kerwin Kofi Charles & Michael McKelligott & Daniel I. Rees, 2022. "Safeguarding Consumers Through Minimum Quality Standards: Milk Inspections and Urban Mortality, 1880-1910," NBER Working Papers 30063, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Anderson, D. Mark & Charles, Kerwin Kofi & McKelligott, Michael & Rees, Daniel I., 2022. "Safeguarding Consumers through Minimum Quality Standards: Milk Inspections and Urban Mortality, 1880-1910," IZA Discussion Papers 15295, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Makofske, Matthew Philip, 2019. "Inspection regimes and regulatory compliance: How important is the element of surprise?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 30-34.
    11. Sarah Dolfin & Nan Maxwell & Alix Gould-Werth & Armando Yañez & Jonah Deutsch & Libby Hendrix, "undated". "Compliance Strategies Evaluation Literature and Database Review," Mathematica Policy Research Reports 92ddb450d98b4b128f4fd1442, Mathematica Policy Research.
    12. Makofske, Matthew, 2024. "Anticipated Monitoring, Inhibited Detection, and Diminished Deterrence," MPRA Paper 120044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Lee Kangoh, 2018. "Optimism, Pessimism, Audit Uncertainty, and Tax Compliance," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-12, January.
    14. Dechenaux Emmanuel & Samuel Andrew, 2019. "Announced or Surprise Inspections and Oligopoly Competition," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 19(1), pages 1-20, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ginger Zhe Jin & Jungmin Lee, 2018. "A Tale of Repetition: Lessons from Florida Restaurant Inspections," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 159-188.
    2. Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Jacques Lawarrée, 2013. "Contracts offered by bureaucrats," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 44(4), pages 686-711, December.
    3. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 171-191, January.
    4. Maria R. Ibanez & Michael W. Toffel, 2020. "How Scheduling Can Bias Quality Assessment: Evidence from Food-Safety Inspections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(6), pages 2396-2416, June.
    5. Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016. "Why Organizations Fail: Models and Cases," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(1), pages 137-192, March.
    6. Kovács, Balázs & Lehman, David W. & Carroll, Glenn R., 2020. "Grade inflation in restaurant hygiene inspections: Repeated interactions between inspectors and restaurateurs," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Nobuo Yoshida, 2000. "The Optimal Combination of Corruption Reforms: Is a Comprehensive Approach a Good Idea?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1335, Econometric Society.
    8. Adnan Q. Khan & Asim I. Khwaja & Benjamin A. Olken, 2016. "Tax Farming Redux: Experimental Evidence on Performance Pay for Tax Collectors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(1), pages 219-271.
    9. David Dranove & Chris Forman & Avi Goldfarb & Shane Greenstein, 2014. "The Trillion Dollar Conundrum: Complementarities and Health Information Technology," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 239-270, November.
    10. Rafael Di Tella & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2008. "Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption: A note on Wealth as a Corruption‐Controlling Device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1552-1571, October.
    11. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00175051, HAL.
    12. Timothy De Stefano & Richard Kneller & Jonathan Timmis, 2014. "The (Fuzzy) Digital Divide: The Effect of Broadband Internet Use on UK Firm Performance," Discussion Papers 14/06, University of Nottingham, School of Economics.
    13. Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M Schmidt, 2007. "Fairness and Contract Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(1), pages 121-154, January.
    14. Jeffrey S. McCullough & Stephen T. Parente & Robert Town, 2013. "Health Information Technology and Patient Outcomes: The Role of Organizational and Informational Complementarities," NBER Working Papers 18684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Luis Garicano & Paul Heaton, 2010. "Information Technology, Organization, and Productivity in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police Departments," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 167-201, January.
    16. Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2005. "Performance Pay and Adverse Selection," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(2), pages 279-298, June.
    17. Chris Forman & Avi Goldfarb & Shane Greenstein, 2009. "The Internet and Local Wages: Convergence or Divergence?," NBER Working Papers 14750, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Luis Garicano & Tano Santos, 2004. "Referrals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 499-525, June.
    19. Dale W. Jorgenson & Mun S. Ho & Kevin J. Stiroh, 2008. "A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 22(1), pages 3-24, Winter.
    20. Khalil, Fahad & Lawarree, Jacques, 2001. "Catching the agent on the wrong foot: ex post choice of monitoring," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 327-347, December.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18939. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.