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Incentives and Outcomes: China's Environmental Policy

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  • Jing Wu
  • Yongheng Deng
  • Jun Huang
  • Randall Morck
  • Bernard Yeung

Abstract

In generating fast economic growth, China is also generating growing concern about its environmental record. Using 2000-2009 data, we find that, while spending on environmental infrastructure has visible positive environmental impact, city spending is strongly tilted towards transportation infrastructure. Investment in transportation infrastructure correlates strongly with both real GDP growth, a measure of tangible economic growth relevant to city-level Party and government cadres' promotion odds, and with land prices, which affect city governments' revenues from land lease sales. In contrast, city governments' spending on environmental improvements is at best uncorrelated with cadres' promotion odds, and is uncorrelated with local GDP growth and land prices. These findings suggest that, were environmental quality explicitly linked to a cadre's chance of promotion, or were environmental quality to affect land prices substantially, city-level public investment in environmental improvement would rise.

Suggested Citation

  • Jing Wu & Yongheng Deng & Jun Huang & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2013. "Incentives and Outcomes: China's Environmental Policy," NBER Working Papers 18754, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18754
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Shengling & Li, Yue & Hao, Yu & Zhang, Yipeng, 2018. "Does public opinion affect air quality? Evidence based on the monthly data of 109 prefecture-level cities in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 299-311.
    2. Shihe Fu & V. Brian Viard, 2022. "A mayors perspective on tackling air pollution," Chapters, in: Charles K.Y. Leung (ed.), Handbook of Real Estate and Macroeconomics, chapter 16, pages 413-437, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Kostka, Genia, 2014. "Barriers to the implementation of environmental policies at the local level in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7016, The World Bank.
    4. Ma, Ben & Zheng, Xinye, 2018. "Biased data revisions: Unintended consequences of China's energy-saving mandates," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 102-113.
    5. Razzaq, Asif & Sharif, Arshian & Ozturk, Ilhan & Skare, Marinko, 2022. "Inclusive infrastructure development, green innovation, and sustainable resource management: Evidence from China’s trade-adjusted material footprints," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    6. Jing‐Lin Duanmu & Maoliang Bu & Russell Pittman, 2018. "Does market competition dampen environmental performance? Evidence from China," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(11), pages 3006-3030, November.
    7. Pedro Naso Author name: Tim Swanson, 2017. "How Does Environmental Regulation Shape Economic Development? A Tax Competition Model of China," CIES Research Paper series 54-2017, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    8. Liqiang Chen & Ming Gao, 2020. "The effects of three types of China's official turnover on air quality: A regression discontinuity study," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 1081-1101, September.
    9. Liu, Yongzheng & Zhang, Xiaoge, 2023. "Environmental regulation, political incentives, and mortality in China," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    10. Zhang, Kun & Zhang, Zong-Yong & Liang, Qiao-Mei, 2017. "An empirical analysis of the green paradox in China: From the perspective of fiscal decentralization," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 203-211.
    11. Zheng, Siqi & Kahn, Matthew E. & Sun, Weizeng & Luo, Danglun, 2014. "Incentives for China's urban mayors to mitigate pollution externalities: The role of the central government and public environmentalism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 61-71.
    12. Zheng, Siqi & Sun, Weizeng & Wu, Jianfeng & Kahn, Matthew E., 2017. "The birth of edge cities in China: Measuring the effects of industrial parks policy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 80-103.
    13. Zhuge, Liqun & Freeman, Richard B. & Higgins, Matthew T., 2020. "Regulation and innovation: Examining outcomes in Chinese pollution control policy areas," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 19-31.
    14. He, Liuyang & Lu, Xi & Lee, Chyen Yee, 2023. "Last mile in anti-poverty drive: Impact of cadres’ appraisals on growth and poverty reduction," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    15. Lingyun He & Nini Chen, 2022. "Turnover of Local Government Officials and Local Air Quality," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 30(4), pages 100-121, July.
    16. Guangdong Xu & Wenming Xu & Shudan Xu, 2018. "Does the establishment of the Ministry of Environmental Protection matter for addressing China’s pollution problems? Empirical evidence from listed companies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 195-224, August.
    17. Sun, Sunny Li & Peng, Mike W. & Lee, Ruby P. & Tan, Weiqiang, 2015. "Institutional open access at home and outward internationalization," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 234-246.
    18. Wang, Jiayi & Lei, Ping, 2021. "The tournament of Chinese environmental protection: Strong or weak competition?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    19. Kahn, Matthew E. & Sun, Weizeng & Wu, Jianfeng & Zheng, Siqi, 2021. "Do political connections help or hinder urban economic growth? Evidence from 1,400 industrial parks in China," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    20. Yu Bai & Yanjun Li, 2022. "Political tournaments and regional growth‐enhancing policies: Evidence from Chinese prefectures," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1358-1385, November.
    21. repec:gii:giihei:ciesrp:cies_rp_27 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Rui Mu, 2018. "Coupling of Problems, Political Attention, Policies and Institutional Conditions: Explaining the Performance of Environmental Targets in the National Five-Year Plans in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(5), pages 1-21, May.
    23. Iris Claus & Les Oxley & Siqi Zheng & Cong Sun & Ye Qi & Matthew E. Kahn, 2014. "The Evolving Geography Of China'S Industrial Production: Implications For Pollution Dynamics And Urban Quality Of Life," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(4), pages 709-724, September.
    24. Tang, Pengcheng & Jiang, Qisheng & Mi, Lili, 2021. "One-vote veto: The threshold effect of environmental pollution in China's economic promotion tournament," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    25. Yu, Jihai & Zhou, Li-An & Zhu, Guozhong, 2016. "Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 23-37.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes

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