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Relative Performance Evaluation and the Turnover of Provincial Leaders in China Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Ye Chen
Hongbin Li
Li-An Zhou
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Paper provided by Chinese University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
00010.
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Date of creation: May 2005Date of revision:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005.
"Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China ,"
Journal of Public Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chengagn Xu, 1997.
"Incentives, Scale Economies and Organizational Form ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1801, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Other versions: Frye, Timothy & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997.
"The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 354-58, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Tirole, Jean, 1994.
"The Internal Organization of Government ,"
Oxford Economic Papers ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 1-29, January.
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Other versions: Lazear, Edward P, 1989.
"Pay Equality and Industrial Politics ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
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Olivier Blanchard & Andrei Shleifer, 2000.
"Federalism With and Without Political Centralization. China versus Russia ,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1889, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Other versions: Bengt Holmstrom, 1982.
"Moral Hazard in Teams ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
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Li, Lixing, 2008.
"The Incentive Role of Creating "Cities" in China ,"
MPRA Paper
8594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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