Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form
AbstractWe model organization as the command-and-communication network of managers erected on top of technology (which is modeled as a collection of plants). In our framework, the role of a manager is to deal with shocks that affect the plants that he oversees directly or indirectly. Organizational form is then an instrument for (a) economizing on managerial costs, and (b) providing managerial incentives. We show that two particular organizational forms, the M-form (multidivisional form) and the U-form (unitary form), are the optimal structures when shocks are sufficiently "big." We argue however that, under certain empirical assumptions, the M-form is likely to be strictly preferable once incentives are taken into account. We conclude by showing that the empirical hypotheses on which this comparison rests are satisfied for Chinese data.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 51.
Date of creation: 01 May 1997
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organizational reform; scale economies; incentives; yardstick competition; China;
Other versions of this item:
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chengagn Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Scale Economies and Organizational Form," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1801, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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- Chen, Ye & Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005.
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Economics Letters, Elsevier,
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