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The tournament of Chinese environmental protection: Strong or weak competition?

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  • Wang, Jiayi
  • Lei, Ping

Abstract

Promotion is an overwhelming motivation for local cadres in China. In the past, local cadres used to compete in economic tournaments for career advancement. As the central government shifts to emphasizing environmental protection, it is critical to examine whether the changed incentive structure drives local cadres to pursue environmental protection. Adopting a database covering cadres and pollution discharge for prefecture-level cities from 2003 to 2016, this paper investigates the relationship between environmental protection tournaments and cadre promotion and explores the mechanism of environmental protection tournaments. The results show that environmental protection tournaments have contributed to cadres' promotion since 2007, when the central government's attention shifted to environmental protection. Environmental protection tournaments mitigate pollution in a “strong” way, through direct policy intervention. Our findings indicate that the existing incentive structure for local cadres' environmental protection is necessary but insufficient.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Jiayi & Lei, Ping, 2021. "The tournament of Chinese environmental protection: Strong or weak competition?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:181:y:2021:i:c:s0921800920305589
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106888
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    7. Zhang, Zhenbo & Wang, Jingwen, 2022. "Undermining or remodeling: Effects of leadership rotation on the effectiveness of authoritarian environmentalism in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    8. Yinuo Wang & Fengxiu Zhou & Huwei Wen, 2023. "Does Environmental Decentralization Promote Renewable Energy Development? A Local Government Competition Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(14), pages 1-18, July.
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