Downward Accountability in Response to Collective Actions: The Political Economy of Public Goods Provision in China
AbstractWill autocratic governments implement policies to satisfy the people’s demands in order to prevent large scale social unrest? This paper explores this question through quantitatively analysis of the political economy of public goods provision in Chinese provinces. I collected data on the number of labor disputes to measure collective actions. My sample includes provincial leaders whose incentives to deliver public goods can either be explained as a result of upward accountability towards the Center or downward accountability towards the citizens. The confounding factor of upward accountability is ruled out by using two-step estimation; and the reverse causality between public goods provision and collective actions is controlled by using instrumental variables. Result suggests that provincial leaders will implement policies more in favor of the citizens in response to intensified labor disputes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2013-26.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 27 Aug 2013
Date of revision:
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Postal: Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
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More information through EDIRC
Accountability; Collective Actions; Public Goods;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-08-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-NPS-2013-08-31 (Nonprofit & Public Sector)
- NEP-PBE-2013-08-31 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-08-31 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRA-2013-08-31 (Transition Economics)
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