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Political survival, local accountability, and long-term development: Evidence from an authoritarian country

Author

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  • Fang, Hanming
  • Hou, Linke
  • Liu, Mingxing
  • Xu, Lixin Colin
  • Zhang, Pengfei

Abstract

We examine how local accountability shapes the policy choices of officials and affect local development in a one-party authoritarian country, China. We argue that county leaders from the strong faction were less likely to pursue pro-development policies because their political survival relied on loyalty to the provincial leader than on grass-root support. By contrast, the political survival of county leaders from the weak factions depended on grassroots support, which induced local accountability and facilitated better local development. In addition, a guerrilla presence in a county further improved development performance because of the natural connections between guerrilla-affiliated cadres and local population. We find supporting evidence using county-level performance in Fujian Province in China. Being from the weak faction and/or having guerrilla presence, by improving local accountability, is associated with sizable long-term benefits including economic growth, private-sector development, local population's education levels and survival rates during the Great Famine. Being with the strong faction and adopting pro-local policies are associated with higher likelihood of political survival.

Suggested Citation

  • Fang, Hanming & Hou, Linke & Liu, Mingxing & Xu, Lixin Colin & Zhang, Pengfei, 2023. "Political survival, local accountability, and long-term development: Evidence from an authoritarian country," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 15-40.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jcecon:v:51:y:2023:i:1:p:15-40
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2022.10.002
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Local accountability; Political survival; Policy; Development performance; Famine;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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