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Accountability in One-Party Government: Rethinking the Success of Chinese Economic Reform

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  • Mario Gilli
  • Yuan Li

Abstract

This paper develops a new argument for the Chinese Communist Party´s success in implementing the post-Mao economic reform. We build a three-player political agency model, showing that the credibility of the threats of deposition by the selectorate and of revolts by citizens are both crucial factors in determining policy outcomes in the authoritarian political system. As the effective size of the selectorate and the cost of revolution vary dramatically across time, our results explain why different types of economic policy arise in different periods in China.

Suggested Citation

  • Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2014. "Accountability in One-Party Government: Rethinking the Success of Chinese Economic Reform," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(4), pages 616-645, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201412)170:4_616:aiogrt_2.0.tx_2-y
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14113700937488
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2013. "A model of Chinese central government," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 21(3), pages 451-477, July.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    3. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2013. "A Model of Chinese Central Government: the Role of Reciprocal Accountability," Working Papers 230, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2013.
    4. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    5. Ronald Coase & Ning Wang, 2012. "How China Became Capitalist," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-01937-0.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mario Gilli & Yuan Li, 2021. "Selectorate’s information and dictator’s accountability," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(5), pages 524-542, September.
    2. Mario, Gilli & Yuan, Li, 2018. "Transitions and Political Stability in Autocracies. The Role of Public Perception," Working Papers 383, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 13 Jul 2018.
    3. Gilli, Mario & Li, Yuan, 2015. "Coups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 109-124.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General

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