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Collective Leadership, Career Concern, and the Housing Market in China: The Role of Standing Committees

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  • Nan Gao
  • Cheryl Xiaoning Long
  • Lixin Colin Xu

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  • Nan Gao & Cheryl Xiaoning Long & Lixin Colin Xu, 2016. "Collective Leadership, Career Concern, and the Housing Market in China: The Role of Standing Committees," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 1-13, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:rdevec:v:20:y:2016:i:1:p:1-13
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/rode.12202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chenggang Xu, 2000. "Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 359-378.
    2. Gehlbach, Scott & Keefer, Philip, 2011. "Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 123-139, June.
    3. Shih, Victor & Adolph, Christopher & Liu, Mingxing, 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(1), pages 166-187, February.
    4. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    5. Kung, James Kai-Sing & Chen, Shuo, 2011. "The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 105(1), pages 27-45, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Y. & He, M. & Rudkin, S., 2017. "Understanding Chinese provincial real estate investment: A Global VAR perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 248-260.
    2. Li, Lixing & Wu, Xiaoyu, 2019. "Housing price and intergenerational co-residence in urban China," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-1.
    3. Nan Gao & Pinghan Liang & Lixin Colin Xu, 2021. "Power struggle and pork barrel politics in authoritarian countries: Evidence from China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 29(1), pages 123-150, January.
    4. Han Yu & Abraham Y. Nahm & Zengji Song, 2022. "Turnover of local government core officials, political connections and the investment and financing of private‐sector enterprises," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 3490-3509, July.

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