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Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence from Rural China

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  • Yang Yao
  • Nancy Qia

    ()

  • Monica Martinez Bravo

    ()

  • Gerard Padro i Miquel

    ()

Abstract

Unique survey data is used to study whether the introduction of local elections in China made local leaders more accountable towards local constituents. A simple model is developed to predict the effects on different policies of increasing local leader accountability, taking into account that there is an autocratic upper government. Variation in the timing of the top-down introduction of elections across villages is studied to estimate the causal effects of elections and find that elections affected policy outcomes in a way that is consistent with the predicted effects of increased local leader accountability. [BREAD Working Paper No. 300]. URL:[http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/working/300.pdf].

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:3931.

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Date of creation: Apr 2011
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Handle: RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3931

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Keywords: mexico; one child policy; leader accountability; rural china; local constituents; elections; policies; local; villages; democracy; public goods; institutions;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Gustavo J Bobonis & Luis R Cámara Fuertes & Rainer Schwabe, 2011. "The Dynamic Effects of Information on Political Corruption: Theory and Evidence from Puerto Rico," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics tecipa-428, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Davide Cantoni & Yuyu Chen & David Y. Yang & Noam Yuchtman & Y. Jane Zhang, 2014. "Curriculum and Ideology," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 20112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Martinez-Bravo, Monica & Padro, Gerard & Qian, Nancy & Yao, Yang, 2012. "The Effects of Democratization on Public Goods and Redistribution: Evidence from China," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2013. "On Economics: A Review of Why Nations Fail by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson and Pillars of Prosperity by T. Besley and T. Persson," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 116-43, March.
  5. Monica Martinez-Bravo, 2014. "The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1244-87, April.
  6. Skoufias, Emmanuel & Narayan, Ambar & Dasgupta, Basab & Kaiser, Kai, 2014. "Electoral accountability and local government spending in Indonesia," Policy Research Working Paper Series, The World Bank 6782, The World Bank.
  7. Li, Yuan, 2013. "Downward Accountability in Response to Collective Actions: The Political Economy of Public Goods Provision in China," Working Paper Series, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics 2013-26, Stockholm China Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics.

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