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The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction

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  • Randall K. Morck
  • Lloyd Steier

Abstract

This paper presents a synopsis of recent NBER studies of the history of corporate governance in Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Together, the studies underscore the importance of path dependence, often as far back into preindustrial period; legal system origin, though in a more nuanced form than mere statutory shareholder rights; and wealthy families. They also clarify the roles of ideologies, business groups, trust, institutional transplants, and politics in institutional evolution and financial development. Other themes are the universality of business insiders' investments in, entrenchment, and a possible behavioral basis for this.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11062.

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Date of creation: Jan 2005
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Publication status: published as The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction , Randall Morck, Lloyd Steier. in A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers , Morck. 2005
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11062

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