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Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance

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  • Randall Morck
  • Bernard Yeung

    ()
    (1Distinguished University Professor and Stephen A. Jarislowsky Distinguished Chair in Finance, School of Business, The University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada T6G2R6; Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research
    2Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117592; Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, New York 10003)

Abstract

Different economies at different times use different institutional arrangements to constrain the people entrusted with allocating capital and other resources. Comparative financial histories show these corporate governance regimes to be largely stable through time, but capable of occasional dramatic change in response to a severe crisis. Legal origin, language, culture, religion, accidents of history (path dependence), and other factors affect these changes because they affect how people and societies solve problems.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Annual Reviews in its journal Annual Review of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 1 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (November)
Pages: 145-179

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Handle: RePEc:anr:refeco:v:1:y:2009:p:145-179

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Related research

Keywords: agency problems; institutions; structural reform; family business groups; oligarchy; corporatism;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Bianco, Madga & Golinelli, Roberto & Parigi, Giuseppe, 2009. "Family firms and investments," MPRA Paper 19247, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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