Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom

Contents:

Author Info

  • Cheffins, Brian R
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The corporate world today subdivides into rival systems of dispersed and concentrated ownership, with different corporate governance structures characterizing each. Various corporate governance experts have argued that ownership concentration is a consequence of poor legal protection of shareholders. The experience in the United Kingdom casts doubt, however, on the extent to which legal regulation matters in the corporate governance context. Developments in Britain suggest that a highly specific set of laws governing companies and financial markets do not have to be in place in order for dispersed share ownership and strong securities markets to develop. Instead, alternative institutional structures can perform the function that "law matters" advocates say the legal system needs to play. Copyright 2001 by the University of Chicago.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

    Volume (Year): 30 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 2 (Part I June)
    Pages: 459-84

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:459-84

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. John Armour & Simon Deakin & Prabirjit Sarkar & Mathias Siems & Ajit Singh, 2008. "Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis," WEF Working Papers 0041, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    2. Chen, Zhiwu, 2003. "Capital markets and legal development: The China case," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 451-472.
    3. Mathias Siems & Priya Lele, 2006. "Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp324, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
    4. Acheson, Graeme G. & Campbell, Gareth & Turner, John D. & Vanteeva, Nadia, 2014. "Corporate ownership and control in Victorian Britain," eabh Papers 14-02, The European Association for Banking and Financial History (EABH).
    5. Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, 2014. "Determinants of corporate governance codes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55828, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Armour, J. & Deakin, S. & Mollica, V. & Siems, M.M., 2010. "Law and Financial Development: What we are learning from time-series evidence," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp399, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
    7. Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, 2005. "The Global History of Corporate Governance: An Introduction," NBER Working Papers 11062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2007. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," NBER Working Papers 13608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Bhagat, Sanjai & Malhotra, Shavin & Zhu, PengCheng, 2011. "Emerging country cross-border acquisitions: Characteristics, acquirer returns and cross-sectional determinants," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 250-271, September.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:459-84. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.