Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the UK

Contents:

Author Info

  • Julian Franks
  • Colin Mayer
  • Stefano Rossi

Abstract

Family ownership was rapidly diluted in the twentieth century in Britain. The main cause was equity issued in the process of making acquisitions. In the first half of the century, it occurred in the absence of minority investor protection and relied on directors of target firms protecting the interests of shareholders. Families were able to retain control by occupying a disproportionate number of seats on the boards of firms. However, in the absence of large stakes, the rise of hostile takeovers and institutional shareholders made it increasingly difficult for families to maintain control without challenge. Potential targets attempted to protect themselves through dual class shares and strategic share blocks but these were dismantled in response to opposition by institutional shareholders and the London Stock Exchange. The result was a regulated market in corporate control and a capital market that looked very different from its European counterparts. Thus, while acquisitions facilitated the growth of family controlled firms in the first half of the century, they also diluted their ownership and ultimately their control in the second half.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10628.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10628.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2005. "Spending Less Time with the Family: The Decline of Family Ownership in the United Kingdom," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 581-612 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10628

Note: CF
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century," CRSP working papers, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago 526, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  2. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 1996. "Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 163-181, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Robert Cull & Lance E. Davis & Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2005. "Historical Financing of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 11695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Marc Goergen, 2005. "Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence From Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 243-268, Summer.
  3. Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, 05.
  4. Naomi Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2004. "Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression," NBER Working Papers 10900, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Santella, Paolo & Baffi, Enrico & Drago, Carlo & Lattuca, Dino, 2008. "A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Obstacles to Institutional Investor Activism in Europe and in the US," MPRA Paper 8929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Vikas Mehrotra & Randall Morck & Jungwook Shim & Yupana Wiwattanakantang, 2011. "Adoptive Expectations: Rising Sons in Japanese Family Firms," NBER Working Papers 16874, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Lazonick, William, 2006. "Corporate Governance, Innovative Enterprise, and Economic Development," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) RP2006/71, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10628. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.