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Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding in America?

In: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers

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Author Info
Marco Becht
J. Bradford DeLong
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This chapter was published in: Marco Becht & J. Bradford DeLong A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, , pages 613-666, 2005.

This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 10278.

Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10278

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Related research
This chapter was published in the following book, which is listed on IDEAS:
Randall K. Morck, 2005. "A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number morc05-1.
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  1. Marco Becht & Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2008. "Returns to Shareholder Activism," OFRC Working Papers Series 2008fe07, Oxford Financial Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  2. Yoser Gadhoum, 2006. "Power of Ultimate Controlling Owners: A Survey of Canadian Landscape," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 179-204, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2009. "Never Waste a Good Crisis: An Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 15042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2005. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the ynamics of Corporate Ownership," NBER Working Papers 11505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Eric Hilt, 2007. "When did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early Nineteenth Century," NBER Working Papers 13093, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Carney, Richard, 2007. "Farmers and Capitalism," MPRA Paper 5148, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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