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Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Christian Traxler () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn)
Joachim Winter () (Department of Economics, University of Munich)
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We discuss survey evidence on individuals' willingness to sanction norm violations – such as evading taxes, drunk driving, fare dodging, or skiving off work – by expressing disapproval or social exclusion. Our data suggest that people condition their sanctioning behavior on their belief about the frequency of norm violations. The more commonly a norm violation is believed to occur, the lower the individuals' inclination to punish it. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we demonstrate that this pattern reflects a causal relationship.
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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number
2009_03.
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Date of creation: Jan 2009Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_03Contact details of provider: Postal: Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10 - D- 53113 Bonn Phone: +49-(0)228 / 91416-0 Fax: +49-(0)228 / 91416-55 Email: Web page: http://www.coll.mpg.de/ More information through EDIRC
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Keywords: Norm Enforcement ; Sanctioning ; Social Norms ; Survey Evidence ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
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Johannes Rincke & Christian Traxler, 2009.
"Deterrence Through Word of Mouth ,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2009_04, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009.
"Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information ,"
Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2009_31, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009.
"Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information ,"
NRN working papers
2009-23, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
[Downloadable!] Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009.
"Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Gerlinde Fellner & Rupert Sausgruber & Christian Traxler, 2009.
"Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information ,"
Working Papers
2009-23, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
[Downloadable!]
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