It is a Theft but not a Crime

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It is a Theft but not a Crime

Author Info

Alessandro Balestrino ()

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Alessandro Balestrino

Abstract

Why do people who normally refrain from committing illegalities become digital pirates? In this paper we use a theoretical model of digital piracy combined with a game-theoretic mechanism of social norm formation to argue that no social stigma is attached to digital piracy because the latter has no perceived social cost; therefore, there is no pressure to build a norm condemning it. We note the existence of a "sophisticate" form of piracy focused on high-quality copies, and not on Internet downloads and black market purchases of low-quality copies like the most common form. Somewhat paradoxically, sophisticate piracy could help to generate a social attitude against piracy, because it is self-containing. However, it is limited in its scope, and it is difficult to predict whether it might ever become sufficiently widespread to effectively engender the formation of an anti-piracy social norm.

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Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 2047.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2047

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Paul Belleflamme & Pierre Picard, 2004. "Piracy and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Paul, BELLEFLAMME & Pierre, PICARD, 2005. "Piracy and competition," UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2005057, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
- Paul Belleflamme & Pierre M. Picard, 2007. "Piracy and Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(2), pages 351-383, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alessandro Balestrino, . "Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison Income Effect," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alessandro Balestrino, 2006. "Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison Income Effect," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Josef Falkinger, 2004. "Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Myles, Gareth D. & Naylor, Robin A., 1996. "A model of tax evasion with group conformity and social customs," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 49-66, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 2001. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(473), pages 506-25, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Dufwenberg, Martin & Lundholm, Michael, 1997. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Working Paper Series 1997:28, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Dufwenberg, M. & Lundholm, M., 1997. "Social Norms and Moral Hazard," Papers 1997-28, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
Akerlof, George A, 1980. "A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One Consequence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(4), pages 749-75, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- George A. Akerlof, 1978. "A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence," Special Studies Papers 118, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2003. "Piracy of Digital Products: A Critical Review of the Economics Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
Banerjee, Dyuti S., 2003. "Software piracy: a strategic analysis and policy instruments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 97-127, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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