A publisher uses an honor system for selling a newspaper in the street. The customers are supposed to pay, but they can also pay less than the price or not pay at all. We conduct an experiment to study honesty in this market. The results show that appealing to honesty increases payments, whereas reminding the customers of the legal norm has no effect. Furthermore, appealing to honesty does not affect the behavior of the dishonest. These findings suggest that some people have internalized an honesty norm, whereas others have not, and that the willingness to pay to obey the norm differs among individuals. In a follow-up survey study we find that honesty is associated with family characteristics, self-esteem, social connectedness, trust in the legal system, and compliance with tax regulations.
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Paper provided by The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria in its series NRN working papers with number
2009-24.
Length: 27 pages Date of creation: Oct 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:jku:nrnwps:2009_24
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Edward L. Glaeser & David I. Laibson & José A. Scheinkman & Christine L. Soutter, 2000.
"Measuring Trust,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 811-846, August.
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