On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency
AbstractIf the agent's preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by McMaster University in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 2010-04.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision: Jun 2012
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More information through EDIRC
take it or leave it offers; menus; common agency; robust equilibrium allocations; mixed-strategy equilibrium;
Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-07-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2010-07-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2010-07-24 (Contract Theory & Applications)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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