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Fundamentalists vs. chartists: learning and predictor choice dynamics

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  • Michele Berardi

Abstract

In a simple, forward looking univariate model of price determination we investigate the evolution of endogenous predictor choice dynamics in presence of two types of agents: fundamentalists an chartists. We find that heterogeneous equilibria in which fundamentalists and chartists coexist are possible, even when the fraction of agents is endogenized. We then combine evolutionary selection among heterogeneous classes of models with adaptive learning in the form of parameter updating within each class of rules and find that equilibria in which chartists constantly outperform fundamentalists seem never to be learnable. Simulations also show that, in general, interactions between learning and predictor choice dynamics do not prevent convergence of both processes towards their equilibrium values when the equilibrium is E-stable.

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Paper provided by Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester in its series Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series with number 104.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:man:cgbcrp:104

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Cited by:
  1. Michele Berardi, 2011. "Heterogeneous sunspots solutions under learning and replicator dynamics," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 160, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.
  2. Michele Berardi, 2013. "On the fragility of sunspot equilibria under learning and evolutionary dynamics," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 186, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester.

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