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Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

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Author Info
Ola Andersson () (Department of Economics,Stockholm School of Economics)
Matteo M. Galizzi () (Department of Economics,University of Brescia)
Tim Hoppe () (Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Sebastian Kranz () (Department of Economics,University of Bonn)
Karen van der Wiel () (CentER,Tiburg University)
Erik Wengström () (Department of Economics,University of Copenhagen)

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Abstract

This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

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File URL: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/femm/a2008_Dateien/2008_20.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management in its series FEMM Working Papers with number 08020.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mag:wpaper:08020

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Related research
Keywords: Communication in Games; Cheap Talk;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2007. "Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 668, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rankin, Frederick W., 2003. "Communication in ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 267-271, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-10.

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