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Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments

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  • Federica Alberti

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)

  • Werner Güth

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena)

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    Abstract

    Banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters who can gain by deceiving those in the role of participants. We compare treatments with and without possible deception by experimenter-participants to test whether deception aects behaviour of participant-participants in a dictator experiment and whether participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception. We nd no dierence in behaviour of participant-participants between the treatments whereas most participants in the role of experimenters engage in deception.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2012-024.

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    Date of creation: 05 Jun 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-024

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    Keywords: Experimental economic methods; Deception; Experiments;

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series 183, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. McDaniel, Tanga & Starmer, Chris, 1998. "Experimental economics and deception: A comment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-409, June.
    3. Bonetti, Shane, 1998. "Experimental economics and deception," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 377-395, June.
    4. Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2001. "The Costs of Deception: Evidence From Psychology," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp191, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
    5. Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean & Schechter, Laura, 2006. "To Deceive or Not to Deceive: The Effect of Deception on Behavior inFuture Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 18, Yale University, Department of Economics.
    6. Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and teams," Working Papers 2007-26, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
    7. Ben Greiner, 2004. "The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics," Working Paper Series in Economics 10, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
    8. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Why free ride? : Strategies and learning in public goods experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 291-304, December.
    9. Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser, 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior," Experimental 0504003, EconWPA, revised 18 May 2005.
    10. Hey, John D., 1998. "Experimental economics and deception: A comment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 397-401, June.
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