Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Costs of Deception: Evidence From Psychology

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andreas Ortmann

    (CERGE-EI)

  • Ralph Hertwig

    (Columbia University)

Abstract

Recently, it has been argued that the evidence in social science research suggests that deceiving subjects in an experiment does not lead to a significant loss of experimental control. Based on this assessment, experimental economists were counseled to lift their de facto prohibition against deception to capture its potential benefits. To the extent that this recommendation is derived from empirical studies, we argue that it draws on a selective sample of the available evidence. Building on a systematic review of relevant research in psychology, we present two major results: First, the evidence suggests that the experience of having been deceived generates suspicion which in turn is likely to affect judgment and decision making of a non-negligible number of participants. Second, we find little evidence for reputational spillover effects that have been hypothesized by a number of authors in psychology and economics (e.g., Kelman, 1967; Davis and Holt, 1993). Based on a discussion of the methodological costs and benefits of deception, we conclude that experimental economists' prohibition of deception is a sensible convention that economists should not abandon.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0203/0203001.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0203001.

as in new window
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 02 Mar 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203001

Note: Type of Document - Acrobat PDF; pages: 36
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Experimental economics; deception; reputational spillover effects;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
  2. Nicholas Bardsley, 2000. "Control Without Deception: Individual Behaviour in Free-Riding Experiments Revisited," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 215-240, December.
  3. Bonetti, Shane, 1998. "Experimental economics and deception," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 377-395, June.
  4. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
  5. Weimann, Joachim, 1994. "Individual behaviour in a free riding experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 185-200, June.
  6. Ortmann, Andreas & Tichy, Lisa K., 1999. "Gender differences in the laboratory: evidence from prisoner's dilemma games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 327-339, July.
  7. Hausken, Kjell, 1995. "The dynamics of within-group and between-group interaction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(7), pages 655-687.
  8. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 653-60, June.
  9. Bonetti, Shane, 1998. "Reply to Hey and Starmer & McDaniel," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 411-414, June.
  10. McDaniel, Tanga & Starmer, Chris, 1998. "Experimental economics and deception: A comment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 403-409, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
  2. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  3. Jade Wong & Andreas Ortman & Alberto Motta & Le Zhang, 2013. "Understanding Social Impact Bonds and Their Alternatives: An Experimental Investigation," Discussion Papers 2013-21, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  4. Andreas Ortmann & Ralph Hertwig, 2006. "Monetary Incentives: Usually Neither Necessary Nor Sufficient?," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp307, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  5. Andreas Ortmann, 2009. ""The Way in which an Experiment is Conducted is Unbelievably Important": On the Experimentation Practices of Economists and Psychologists," CESifo Working Paper Series 2887, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Jamison, Julian & Karlan, Dean & Schechter, Laura, 2006. "To Deceive or Not to Deceive: The Effect of Deception on Behavior inFuture Laboratory Experiments," Working Papers 18, Yale University, Department of Economics.
  7. Alberti, Federica & Güth, Werner, 2013. "Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 196-204.
  8. Krajc, Marian & Ortmann, Andreas, 2008. "Are the unskilled really that unaware? An alternative explanation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 724-738, November.
  9. Astrid Matthey & Tobias Regner, 2013. "On the independence of history: experience spill-overs between experiments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 75(3), pages 403-419, September.
  10. Colson, Gregory & Huffman, Wallace E. & Rousu, Matthew C., 2011. "Improving the Nutrient Content of Food through Genetic Modification: Evidence from Experimental Auctions on Consumer Acceptance," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 36(2), August.
  11. Terry Connolly & Jochen Reb, 2012. "Regret aversion in reason-based choice," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 35-51, July.
  12. Arno Riedl, 2009. "Behavioral and Experimental Economics Can Inform Public Policy: Some Thoughts," CESifo Working Paper Series 2902, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Federica Alberti & Werner Güth, 2012. "Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-024, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  14. Jade Wong & Andreas Ortmann, 2014. "On Uneven Expected Earnings in the Lab," Discussion Papers 2014-07, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  15. Innocenti, Alessandro, 2010. "How a psychologist informed economics: The case of Sidney Siegel," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 421-434, June.
  16. Fiore, Annamaria, 2009. "Experimental Economics: Some Methodological Notes," MPRA Paper 12498, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0203001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.