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On approval and disapproval: Theory and experiments

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  • López-Pérez, Raúl
  • Vorsatz, Marc

Abstract

Prior studies have shown that selfish behavior is reduced when co-players have the opportunity to approve/disapprove a player's choice, even if that has no consequences on the player's material payoff. Using a prisoner's dilemma, we experimentally study the causes of this phenomenon, which seems crucial to understand compliance with social norms. Our data is consistent with a model based on the assumption that people feel badly if they expect to be disapproved by others. Furthermore, we find suggestive evidence in line with the following assumptions: (i) people become more aware about the other's opinion if feedback is available, and (ii) even if the feedback is ex post and has no effect on their ex ante expectations about disapproval, people prefer not to receive negative feedback.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Psychology.

Volume (Year): 31 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 527-541

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Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:527-541

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/joep

Related research

Keywords: Approval Disapproval Non-material rewards/sanctions Social norms;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. repec:ksb:journl:v:4:y:2011:i:1:p:77-88 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 77-88, December.
  3. Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  4. Adam Zylbersztejn, 2013. "Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00800587, HAL.
  5. Czap, Hans J. & Czap, Natalia V. & Khachaturyan, Marianna & Burbach, Mark E. & Lynne, Gary D., 2011. "Smiley or Frowney: The effect of emotions and framing in a downstream water pollution game," 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 102696, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  6. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Approval Voting: A Multi-outcome Election," MPRA Paper 50674, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 20 Apr 2011.
  7. Timothy C. Salmon & Danila Serra, 2013. "Does Social Judgement Diminish Rule Breaking?," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2013-05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  8. Raúl López-Pérez & Marc Vorsatz, 2012. "What Behaviors are Disapproved? Experimental Evidence from Five Dictator Games," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(2), pages 78-96, April.
  9. Fabrice Le Lec & Astrid Matthey & Ondrej Rydval, 2012. "Punishment Fosters Efficiency in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-030, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  10. Raúl López-Pérez & Eli Spiegelman, 2013. "Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversion," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 233-247, September.

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