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A Cash Effect in Ultimatum Game Experiments

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  • Junyi Shen

    (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan)

  • Hiromasa Takahashi

    (Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University, Japan)

Abstract

This paper reports two experiments involving an ultimatum game, conducted in Japan. There were two treatments in our experiments. One was called a cash session and the other was called a point session. The cash session means introducing cash into the ultimatum game. In other words, in a cash session, subjects bargained money in cash but not points or tokens as most prior experiments did. We found that compared to those in the point sessions, proposers offered more and responders rejected less in the cash sessions. These evidences imply that a cash effect does exist in the ultimatum game experiments.

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File URL: http://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2013-13.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number DP2013-13.

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Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2013-13

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Keywords: Cash effect; Ultimatum game; Cost-loss discrepancy; Experimental design;

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