This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Persuasion in Experimental Ultimatum Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ola Andersson
Matteo M. Galizzi
Tim Hoppe
Sebastian Kranz
Karen van der Wiel
Erik Wengstrom

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper experimentally studies persuasion effects in ultimatum games and finds that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before their acceptance decision. Higher payoffs are due to higher acceptance rates as well as more aggressive offers by Proposers.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.unibs.it/on-line/dse/Home/Ricerca/Paperdeldipartimento/documento9727.html
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Brescia, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0811.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:0811

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via S. Faustino 74/B, 25122 Brescia
Phone: +39-(0)30-2988704
Web page: http://www.unibs.it/atp/page.1019.0.0.0.atp?node=224
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Matteo Galizzi).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus, 2007. "Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 668, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rankin, Frederick W., 2003. "Communication in ultimatum games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 267-271, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-15.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.