Decentralized Trade with Bargaining and Voluntary Matching
AbstractRubinstein and Wolinsky (1990) study a market with one seller, two buyers, and voluntary matching. Both the competitive outcome p[subscript c] and the bilateral bargaining outcome p[subscript b] are possible in subgame perfect equilibrium. We consider two variations. First, if there is a cost larger that p[subscript c]-p[subscript b] to the seller of changing partner, p[subscript b] is the unique outcome, otherwise no restriction expires. In the second variation the seller makes an Epsilon-binding preannouncement of whether he will change buyers after disagreement. If Epsilon is small there are equilibrium prices close to p[subscript b]. But for any Epsilon, if the discount factor is close to 1, the unique equilibrium price is p[subscript c].
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 93-08.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1993
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Economic Design, 1994, 1(1) pp 55-77
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decentralized trade; competitive equilibrium; sequential bargaining; markets;
Other versions of this item:
- Ebbe Hendon & Birgitte Sloth & Torben Tranæs, 1994. "Decentralized trade with bargaining and voluntary matching," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 55-77, December.
- O22 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Project Analysis
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
252, David K. Levine.
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
623, David K. Levine.
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- Hendon, Ebbs & Tranaes, Torben, 1991.
"Sequential bargaining in a market with one seller and two different buyers,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier,
Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 453-466, November.
- Ebbe Groes & Torben Tranæs, 1989. "Sequential Bargaining in a Market with One Seller and Two Different Buyers," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 89-22, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Sempere-Monerris, José J. & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., 1997. "Bargaining with Externalities: Licensing of an Innovation," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales), UniversitÃ© catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) 1997007, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- Mitsutoshi M. Adachi, 1998. "A note on frictions in the Bazaar type bargaining game," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(2), pages 293-304, May.
- Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2003. "A decentralized market with trading links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 83-103, February.
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