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Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

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Author Info
Chatterjee, Kalyan
Dutta, Bhaskar

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45JC9DG-1P/2/408b8dd9e5b80e9af69ef0b60f1695cd
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 23 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 119-145
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:119-145

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2009. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," MPRA Paper 17606, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  2. Gary Charness & Margarida Corominas-Bosch & GUILLAUME FRECHETTE, 2005. "Bargaining and Network Structure: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 05-05, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kalyan Chatterjee & Y. Chiu, 2007. "When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?," Topics in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1220-1220. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, 2006. "Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 762, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Matteo Maria GALIZZI, 2006. "Gas thin markets:insights from bargaining and networks models," Departemental Working Papers 2006-12, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
  7. Michael Sattinger, 2003. "Price Dynamics and the Market for Access to Trading Partners," Discussion Papers 03-10, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Matteo M. Galizzi, 2009. "Bargaining and Networks in a Gas Bilateral Oligopoly," Working Papers 0906, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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