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Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity

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Author Info

  • Nadine Chlaß

    ()
    (Friedrich Schiller University Jena, Germany)

  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany)

  • Topi Miettinen

    (SITE Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden.)

Abstract

Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-069.

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Date of creation: 12 Aug 2009
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-069

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Keywords: procedural preferences; experiment; procedural fairness;

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Cited by:
  1. Nadine Chlaß & Peter G. Moffatt, 2012. "Giving in Dictator Games - Experimenter Demand Effect or Preference over the Rules of the Game?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-044, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  2. Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2010. "Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-073, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  3. Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2013. "Discriminatory Taxes are Unpopular - Even when they are Efficient and Distributionally Fair," Discussion Papers 13-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  4. Werner Güth, 2013. "Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.

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