Beyond Procedural Equity and Reciprocity
AbstractMost research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on other's intentions while they have different outcome-invariant properties. Agents are experimentally confirmed to exhibit preferences over these which link to psychological attributes of their moral judgment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2009-069.
Date of creation: 12 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
procedural preferences; experiment; procedural fairness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-08-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-08-22 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2009-08-22 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EXP-2009-08-22 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2009-08-22 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2009-08-22 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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- Werner Güth, 2013. "Endogenous Community Formation and Collective Provision - A Procedurally Fair Mechanism," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2010.
"Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
2010-073, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Werner Güth & M. Vittoria Levati & Matteo Ploner, 2013. "Does Procedural Fairness Crowd Out Other-Regarding Concerns? A Bidding Experiment," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(3), pages 433-450, September.
- Nadine Chlaß & Peter G. Moffatt, 2012. "Giving in Dictator Games - Experimenter Demand Effect or Preference over the Rules of the Game?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2012-044, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
- Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2013. "Discriminatory Taxes are Unpopular - Even when they are Efficient and Distributionally Fair," Discussion Papers 13-14, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
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