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Parametric Contest Success Functions

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Author Info
Birendra K. Rai () (Max Planck Institute of Economics)
Rajiv Sarin () (Texas AM University, Department of Economics)
Abstract

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametric families of CSF’s. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends on the investments and a vector of parameters, where each parameter is specific to one of the contestants. In the second, the winning probabilities depend on investments and a scalar parameter common to all contestants.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers in Economics with number 2007-010.

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Date of creation: 27 Apr 2007
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2007-010

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Related research
Keywords: Contest success function; Axiomatization; Rent seeking;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Asymmetric Contests with General Technologies," Keele Economics Research Papers KERP 2002/22, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rosen, Sherwin, 1986. "Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 701-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
    Other versions:
  4. Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview," Working Papers 050623, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2006. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Snyder, James M, 1989. "Election Goals and the Allocation of Campaign Resources," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 637-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nitzan, Shmuel, 1994. "Modelling rent-seeking contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 41-60, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nti, Kofi O., 2004. "Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 1059-1066, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Corchon, Luis C, 2000. " On the Allocative Effects of Rent Seeking," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(4), pages 483-91. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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