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New contest success functions

Author

Listed:
  • Satya R. Chakravarty

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India)

  • Bhargav Maharaj

    (Ramakrishna Mission Vidyamandira, Belur, India)

Abstract

Skaperdas (1996) characterized the contest success function (CSF), which stipulates the winning probabilities of the contestants, using respectively the scale invariance and translation invariance axioms. This paper first characterizes the entire family of CSFs that fulfils a convex mixture of the two axioms. This family contains the Skaperdas CSFs as special cases. Next, we consider two ordinal axioms, scale consistency and translation consistency, and characterize the respective classes of CSFs. While the former consists of the Skaperdas scale invariant and translational invariant CSFs and some new functional forms, the latter contains the Skaperdas translation invariant CSF and some additional CSFs that were not considered in the literature earlier.

Suggested Citation

  • Satya R. Chakravarty & Bhargav Maharaj, 2014. "New contest success functions," Working Papers 340, ECINEQ, Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
    • Handle: RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2014-340
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    File URL: http://www.ecineq.org/milano/WP/ECINEQ2014-340.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Cubel, María & Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2016. "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 131(PA), pages 92-105.
    2. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Cubel, Maria, 2015. "An axiomatization of difference-form contest success functions," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-49, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    3. Matija Kovacic & Claudio Zoli, 2021. "Ethnic distribution, effective power and conflict," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(2), pages 257-299, August.
    4. Christian Ewerhart, 2015. "Contest success functions: the common-pool perspective," ECON - Working Papers 195, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contest; success function; invariance axioms; ordinal axioms.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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