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A Threshold Interpretation of the Ratio-Form Contest Success Function

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  • Jeremy Petranka

    (Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Indiana University Kelley School of Business)

Abstract

Ratio-form contest success functions have been widely used due to their appealing axiomatic properties. Existing microfoundational models offer additional justifications for their use in specific economic applications. I propose a new structure under which a ratio-form contest success function can be derived as a limit result using an underlying contest with multiple rounds and threshold success levels. This model generalizes the stochastic equivalence of ratio-form contest success functions and patent race games, allowing greater fl exibility in the underlying structural interpretation. I additionally formulate a spatial interpretation of the model and apply the general structure to existing models of conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Petranka, 2009. "A Threshold Interpretation of the Ratio-Form Contest Success Function," Working Papers 2010-06, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Mar 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:iuk:wpaper:2010-06
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    File URL: http://kelley.iu.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bepp2010-06-petranka.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Jeremy Petranka, 2008. "A Conflict Theory of Voting," Working Papers 2010-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Mar 2010.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jeremy Petranka, 2008. "A Conflict Theory of Voting," Working Papers 2010-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Mar 2010.

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