The Economics of First-Contract Mediation
AbstractThis paper provides an economic foundation for non-binding mediation to stimulate first collective bargaining agreements, as implemented in British Columbia since 1993. We show that the outcome of first-contract mediation is Pareto efficient and proves immune to the insider-outsider problem of underhiring. We also demonstrate that equilibrium wages and profits under mediation coincide with the Owen values of the corresponding cooperative game with the coalitional structure that follows from unionization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7541.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-08-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2013-08-16 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2013-08-16 (Sports & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-97, June.
- Bauer, Christian & Lingens, Jörg, 2010. "Individual vs. Collective Bargaining in the Large Firm Search Model," Discussion Papers in Economics 11315, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Catherine C. de Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2003. "Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 448-455, March.
- Westermark, Andreas, 2003. "Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 296-311, May.
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