Enterprise Bargaining, Union Structure and Wages
AbstractModels of simultaneous bargaining games are used to analyze the wage outcomes associated with various systems of industrial relations, including bargaining by craft, enterprise, industry, or the whole economy. Union structure is a key determinant with highest wage pressure occurring when unions are organized along craft lines at industry level. Abandonment of centralized bargaining and the splintering of both union and employer organizations into craft and industry units may well lead both to higher aggregate wage pressure and to greater wage inequality. Copyright 1993 by The Economic Society of Australia.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Australian National University - Department of Economics in its series Papers with number 242.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1992
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Postal: THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, RESEARCH SCHOOL of PACIFIC STUDIES, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, G.P.O. 4, CANBERRA ACT 2601 AUSTRALIA..O. BOX 4 CANBERRA 2601 AUSTRALIA.
Web page: http://economics.anu.edu.au/economics.htm
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