Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power
Abstract"We develop a game-theoretic version of the" right-to-manage "model of firm-level bargaining where strategic interactions among firms are explicitly recognized. Our main aim is to investigate how equilibrium wages and employment react to changes in various labor and product market variables. We show that our comparative statics results hinge crucially on the strategic nature of the game, which in turn is determined by the relative bargaining power of unions and managers." Copyright 1996 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Volume (Year): 5 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/journals/JEMS/
Other versions of this item:
- A. Jorge Padilla & Samuel Bentolila & Juan J. Dolado, 1996. "Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power," Banco de Espaï¿½a Working Papers 9616, Banco de Espa�a.
- Bentolila, Samuel & Dolado, Juan J. & Padilla, Atilano Jorge, 1994. "Wage Bargaining in Industries with Market Power," CEPR Discussion Papers 987, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Union-oligopoly bargaining and entry deterrence: a reassessment of limit pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 121-147, November.
- Jo Seldeslachts, 2002. "Interactions Between Product and Labour Market Reforms," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 519.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, 2005. "The endogenous national minimum wage institution," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 747-762, December.
- Rupayan Pal & Bibhas Saha, 2008. "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining and Entry Deterrence:A Reassessment of Limit Pricing," Working Papers id:1375, eSocialSciences.
- Emmanuel Petrakis & Minas Vlassis, 2004.
"Endogenous wage bargaining institutions in oligopolistic sectors,"
Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 55-73, 07.
- Emmanuel Petrakis & Minas Vlassis, . "Endogenous Wage-Bargaining Institutions in Oligopolistic Sectors," Working Papers 0105, University of Crete, Department of Economics, revised 00 Dec 2001.
- Esperanza Gracia, 1999. "Márgenes y cuotas de mercado. Un análisis con un micropanel," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(3), pages 393-428, September.
- Giorgio Brunello & Daniela Sonedda, 2002. "Labor Tax Progressivity, Wage Determination, and the Relative Wage Effect," CESifo Working Paper Series 721, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bughin, Jacques, 1999. "The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(7), pages 1029-1040, October.
- Emmanuel Petrakis & Minas Vlassis, 1999. "The strategic role of minimum sectorial wages in oligopoly: a case for the Spanish labour market," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(3), pages 331-350, September.
- Gürtzgen, Nicole, 2001. "Trade liberalisation and union wages in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 28, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
- Petrakis, Emmanuel & Vlassis, Minas, . "Endogenous wage-bargaining institutions in oligopolistic industries," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/6014, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Joaquín Andaluz, 2011. "Validity of the “Principle of Maximum Product Differentiation” in a unionized mixed-duopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 123-136, March.
- Nicole GÃ¼rtzgen, 2002. "Trade Liberalization and Union Wages in a Differentiated Bertrand Duopoly," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 133-151, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.